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*224  Introduction
Jerusalem is the capital city no one recognizes. 1  Deeply tied to each of the world's major monotheistic religions, access
to its major spiritual sites has been protected by regimes as diverse in time and circumstance as the Ottoman Empire, the
Western European powers occupying it either as colonizers or stewards, and the modern States of Israel and Jordan. 2
The critical role it plays for the world's religious adherents (together, Christians and Muslims account for roughly half the
global population) explains its status under international law and the challenges modern governments face in reconciling
effective Israeli control of the city with its regional and global significance. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181
provided for the separation of the British Mandate of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states and carved out Jerusalem
as a corpus separatum under the sovereignty of no state. 3  That policy effectively captures the foreign policies of most
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states today, which not only refuse to acknowledge Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem, which it occupied, annexed
and expanded in 1967, but also West Jerusalem, which it has held since shortly after its founding in 1948. 4
Since Israel's establishment, the United States has acted consistently with Resolution 181 and its general vision for
peacefully coexisting Arab and Jewish states in the land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, although
the borders and character of those states have evolved over time. 5  The United States has similarly refused to prejudice
Jerusalem. It recognizes no state's sovereignty over either West or East Jerusalem and maintains a consular presence
there separate from the activities of the Ambassador to Israel located in Tel Aviv. 6  This Article *225  argues that U.S.
policy toward Israel/Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular is changing to allow greater flexibility toward the
political realities that may confront both the city and the countries that surround it. Analyzing presidential speeches on
Jerusalem from Clinton to Obama as well as litigation embodying congressional-presidential disagreement over the city,
this Article concludes that U.S. policy, while still technically adhering to the two-state solution, has openly if quietly
acknowledged that the window for two states is closing if it has not closed already. If the Palestinian movement for self-
determination changes from one sounding in international law and the language of sovereignty to one situated within
the context of civil rights and equal treatment with Israelis, the United States may face, and is preparing to face, a
single political entity with significant Arab and Jewish populations. Jerusalem is already a microcosm of this reality,
with its Arab residents increasingly electing Israeli citizenship, voting in municipal elections, and integrating into Israeli
institutions of higher education.
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
Jerusalem, far more than conventional wisdom suggests, is fundamentally and essentially tied to the viability of the two-
state solution. The city lies on the periphery of Israel proper and deep into territory surrounded by the borders of the
West Bank. 7  One of Israel's *226  most important West Bank settlements, Ma'ale Adumim, lies to the east of Jerusalem
and Israel maintains concrete plans to link the two, effectively dissecting the West Bank. As a result, the question of
Jerusalem really is the question of two states or one.
This Article analyzes presidential speeches and the pleadings of the U.S. Government in response to a lawsuit by
Jerusalem-born U.S. citizen Menachem Zivotofsky seeking to have “Israel” listed in his U.S. passport rather than
“Jerusalem” as U.S. law now requires. The picture that emerges is one of a growing flexibility in U.S. policy toward Israel/
Palestine in general and Jerusalem in particular. That flexibility moves away from adherence to two states (and impliedly
two capitals in Jerusalem) to one emphasizing various “kinds” of democracy that may characterize a future Israeli state.
Part I of this Article provides a brief summary of Jerusalem in the history of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as well as U.S.
law and policy toward Jerusalem. Part II provides a brief overview of the scholarly disagreement over how and under
what circumstances the United States develops its foreign policy preferences focusing on interpretations of international
law. Contesting the widespread view that foreign policy positions and interpretations of international law are traceable
to responsible bureaucracies who act with a clear path to their desired outcome, Part II argues that U.S. foreign policy
and legal positions are subject to intermittent but nevertheless influential legal pressures-what Rebecca Ingber describes
as “interpretation catalysts”-that regularly force the United States to frame or re-frame foreign policy preferences.
These catalysts include both presidential speeches and litigation over foreign policy positions. Part II analyzes two of
these framing events: Presidential speeches from Clinton to Obama and pleadings filed in the long-running dispute
between Menachem Zivotofsky and the U.S. Government over the designation in his passport. That litigation is, in
effect, the latest round in the dispute between Congress and the President over Jerusalem's status under U.S. law. Part III
applies insights from the analysis in Part II to current trends in the movement for Palestinian self-determination. Those
trends demonstrate a shift in ideology from self-determination as a form of sovereignty under international law to self-
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determination as civil rights and equality with Israeli citizens. As a result of these movements, I ultimately argue that
U.S. policy is shifting in preparation for the window to two-states closing, if it has not closed already. 8
*227  I. U.S. Policy Toward Jerusalem: An Overview
Scholarly histories of the colonial, political, social, and geostrategic changes leading to the formation of a Zionist
movement in Europe and its focus on Palestine as the site for the establishment of a Jewish state are arguably as conflicting
and angry as the wars that ensued. 9  What may be safely stated is that Jerusalem's historical and religious importance
made it an early and frequent flashpoint as European Jewish immigrants and the indigenous Arab population built
mutual mistrust from the late nineteenth century and into the early twentieth. After the British government pledged its
support for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine in 1917, both urban and rural Arab populations
organized protests against the so-called “Balfour Declaration.” 10  In 1920, riots broke out in Jerusalem's Old City which
killed nine people and left hundreds injured. 11  Between 1921 and 1929, Jerusalem became the focal point of prominent
Palestinians' efforts to lobby the British government to end liberal Jewish immigration policies as well as to articulate
a Palestinian self-determination movement that differed from the larger pan-Arab movement prompted by the collapse
of the Ottoman Empire. 12
*228  The political spilled over to the religious. In the Old City of Jerusalem, the Western or Wailing Wall runs along
the western edge of the Haram al-Sharif, or Temple Mount, an area believed in Islamic tradition to be the place where
Muhammad ascended to heaven and in Judaism as the general location of the most important inner sanctuary of the
First and Second Temples (in English generally rendered as “holy of holies” or “most holy place”). 13  In Christian and
Jewish traditions, the site is tied to Abraham's willingness, at God's request, to sacrifice his son Isaac (in Islamic tradition,
Abraham and his son-whether it is Ismail or Isaac is not clear-share the decision to sacrifice and the location is thought
to be closer to Mecca). 14
Since 1187, the Temple Mount area has been administered by an Islamic trust (waqf). 15  Throughout the centuries, access
to the Western Wall and the Temple Mount has been largely available to religious adherents who have been for the most
part mutually tolerant with respect to worship practices. Beginning as early as 1925, Arab residents and worshippers
started to perceive what would have historically been relatively minor actions like placing chairs or screens at the Western
Wall as efforts to assert Jewish sovereignty over the site. 16  Between August 15, 1929 and August 19, 1929, Jews and
Arabs undertook separate, politically charged marches on the Western Wall, asserting their sovereignty over it. Both
Arabic and Hebrew language press published inflammatory flyers and leaflets accompanying the marches. 17  In the
riots that ensued, 133 Jews and 116 Arabs were killed and 339 *229  Jews and 232 Arabs were injured. 18  While many
tales emerged that reflected intercommunal sympathies (Jewish hospitals treated Arab victims while Arab neighbors
hid and gave refuge to Jews), the riots opened an intractable fissure between Arab and Jewish communities that was
to eventually manifest in open war. 19  After a far more widespread revolt by Palestinian Arabs in 1936, the British
government introduced the first of many future proposals that aimed to divide mandatory Palestine into Arab and Jewish
states (see map to left), 20  swap territory to accommodate demographic realities, and ensure that Jerusalem remained
open and available to the millions of pilgrims who wished to visit it. 21
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
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The Peel Commission Report was issued in 1937 and was deemed unworkable a year later by a separate commission
because both Arabs and Jews rejected it. 22  In 1939, the British government reversed course and proposed a single state
of Palestine with Arabs and Jews ruling in proportion to their populations as well as promising limitations on Jewish
immigration. While the document was silent as to Jerusalem's status, it exhorted Arabs and Jews to cooperate “together
to ensure peace . . . because their country is revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the
world who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.” 23  Zionist communities and increasingly
well- *230  armed militia groups forcefully opposed the proposal. 24  Between 1939 and 1946, World War II thinned
an already inadequate British security presence, Jewish institutions (including the nascent Israeli military) became more
developed, and the United Nations replaced the League of Nations as the forum in which the question of Palestine would
be resolved.
In 1947, the British government announced its intention to terminate its mandate over Palestine and invited
recommendations from the newly established United Nations. In response, the United Nations appointed a Special
Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) which presented a number of recommendations including partition, economic
union, and a single federal state. 25  The final resolution, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181, favored partition
between Arab and Jewish states with Jerusalem designated as a corpus separatum under U.N. authority.
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
Resolution 181 was adopted on November 29, 1947 and the British withdrew from Palestine on May 14, 1948. 26
Between these two dates Arab and Jewish sides fought an internal civil war in the mandate territory and afterwards, Arab
forces from surrounding states invaded in *231  an effort to prevent partition. 27  Although the new Israeli leadership
technically accepted Resolution 181, 28  including Jerusalem's status, it undertook an organized campaign to empty West
Jerusalem of its Arab inhabitants to (1) establish the capital of the new state there and (2) secure the route between
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, then and now Israel's most populous city. 29  While Jordan did not accept Resolution 181 (and
therefore Jerusalem's international status), it colluded with the Israeli leadership to expropriate the bulk of the territories
Resolution 181 designated for Palestinian Arabs. 30  The war left Jerusalem divided between Israel and Jordan, with the
Old City and its major religious sites under Jordanian control. 31
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
32
*232  In 1967, Israel conquered all of Jerusalem and the West Bank, politically reunifying the city and obtaining control
over the Temple Mount which it left under the stewardship of the Islamic waqf. 33  It offered Israeli citizenship to Arabs
living in Jerusalem in 1967, most of whom rejected the offer. 34  They became so-called Jerusalem residents, neither
citizens of Israel nor civilians subject to the same rules of occupation which applied to other Palestinian residents living
in the West Bank.
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
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In 1980, Israel officially annexed East Jerusalem and the areas within the redrawn municipal boundary which included
settlements built over the 1967 “Green Line.” 36  The U.N. Security Council declared *233  the “Jerusalem Law” null
and void and a violation of international law. 37  In 1993, Israel and the Palestinians agreed to settle the final status of
Jerusalem and other matters by negotiation. 38
U.S. Executive Branch policy from 1948 forward never recognized Israeli or Jordanian sovereignty over any part of
Jerusalem. 39  In 1949, when Israel announced its intention to convene its parliament's first meeting in the part of
Jerusalem it controlled, the United States refused to send a representative to attend, noting that the U.S. Government
*234  “cannot support any arrangement which would purport to authorize the establishment of Israeli . . . sovereignty
over parts of the Jerusalem area.” 40  The United States similarly opposed the Jordanian effort to declare East Jerusalem
its “second” capital (after Amman) in 1950. 41  The State Department established a formal diplomatic presence in
Tel Aviv for relations with Israel and separate consular offices in Jerusalem. 42  Arab and Jewish U.S. citizens born
within Jerusalem's 1948 municipal borders are designated as having been born in “Jerusalem” consistent with this non-
recognition. Congress, however, became more active on the issue after the 1980 Jerusalem Law, both directly and
indirectly seeking to have the city's status as Israel's capital formalized. 43  Several U.S. Presidents, including Ronald
Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and William Clinton, have stated that Jerusalem should remain united and its final status
should be determined by negotiation, implying that Israelis and Palestinians might both establish recognized capitals
there and further implying that U.S. policy disfavors separation of the type experienced between 1948 and 1967. 44
II. Jerusalem Under U.S. Law
U.S foreign policy positions including interpretations of international law are often depicted as the result of a deliberative
process that originates within a fixed set of institutions like the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the
Department of the Treasury, or other foreign policy bureaucracies. 45  There is correspondingly little *235  agreement as
to which of these constituencies, or the President, prevails when they disagree, but that disagreement focuses principally
on internal factors within the foreign policy making and legal interpretation frameworks. 46
The reality is more complex. 47  Foreign policy outcomes and legal interpretations are guided not only by the conscious
construction of decision-making agencies and persons as well as constitutional constraints, but also by myriad social,
psychological and structural frames. 48  Public statements by foreign policy decision-makers, for example, form real
expectations for the speaker and those upon whom the speaker relies (like economic and military partners). So deviations,
even minor ones, may facilitate major changes. 49  This explains in part how Clinton's 2000 parameters for Israeli-
Palestinian peace could make explicit the U.S. objective of a state of “Palestine” without actually uttering that word,
which George W. Bush was the first U.S. President to do.
Rebecca Ingber has elaborated upon a particular set of these frames which she labels “interpretation catalysts.” 50
According to her analysis, foreign policy preferences and legal interpretations are not only inherited and shaped from
one administration to the next, but also influenced by exogenous events which require the President and executives
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surrounding bureaucracies to “consider, determine, and assert, whether publicly or not, a position on a matter of legal
interpretation.” 51  These events include, inter alia, a legal position asserted in the course of litigation, the formation of
the President's position in a speech or other announcement, or periodic reporting requirements imposed under human
rights treaties. 52  With respect to Jerusalem, two of these interpretation “catalysts” have prompted *236  identifiable if
subtle changes in U.S. policy toward Jerusalem: (1) Litigation between the Executive and a Jerusalem-born U.S. citizen,
Menachem Zivotofsky, to have “Israel” listed as the place of birth in his passport and (2) Presidential speeches from
Clinton to Obama.
A. Congress and the President on Jerusalem from Clinton to Obama
The Zivotofsky litigation is the most recent manifestation of a long-running disagreement between Congress and the
President over the status of Jerusalem under both U.S. and international law. 53  Congress's position on Jerusalem took
its strongest form with the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, although there were several precursors that failed because
Congress could not agree on a statutory strategy. 54  In 1983, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan introduced legislation
which would have required the U.S. embassy in Israel to be moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The Secretary of State,
George Shultz, in a letter to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, objected to this legislation on the
grounds that it interfered with the President's authority to recognize foreign governments at his discretion. 55  Subsequent
statements by the administration affirmed this position 56  and criticized the bill on the grounds that it would undermine
the United States' ability to aid in the peace process, 57  and that peace could come about only through negotiations. 58
In 1990, President George H.W. Bush stated publicly that the Israeli government should establish no new settlements
in East Jerusalem. 59  In response to this statement, Congress passed Senate Concurrent *237  Resolution 106. 60  This
resolution, which passed overwhelmingly in the House of Representatives, 61  stated Congress's position that Jerusalem
is and should remain the capital of Israel. 62  The President, during a meeting with Jerusalem's mayor, indicated that the
city's final status should be determined by negotiations. 63  In 1992, Congress passed Senate Concurrent Resolution 113.
This resolution largely reiterated the stance of Congress presented in the previous resolution. 64  Despite the similarities,
this resolution did not elicit any appreciable response from President Bush or his administration.
The Jerusalem Embassy Act, 65  enacted in 1995, was the first movement in Congress which garnered sufficient support
to impose statutorily binding language based on at least some constitutional authority. 66  Not only did the Act call for
recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital, it also ordered that a new embassy in Jerusalem should be established no later
than May 31 of 1999. 67  The law included a provision authorizing the President to waive that part of the law in the
name of U.S. national interests. The waiver allows the President to postpone moving the embassy to protect national
security. 68  President Clinton opposed the law on the basis that it prejudiced the U.S. stand on Jerusalem and subverted
his constitutional authority. 69  Despite his public opposition to the bill, Clinton did not veto it, stating that it would most
likely be overridden by Congress. The President did make clear that he would utilize the waiver to prevent relocation
of the embassy. 70
*238  During the George W. Bush administration, Congress enacted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 2003 71  which included a section addressing U.S. policy toward Jerusalem. This section included four primary
mandates: (1) to immediately relocate the embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in compliance with the Jerusalem
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Embassy Act of 1995, 72  (2) to limit funding for the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem unless it is placed under the control of
the Ambassador to Israel, (3) to limit funding for publication of government documents which do not list Jerusalem as
the capital of Israel, and (4) to allow U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to have “Jerusalem, Israel” listed as their place of
birth on passports. 73  Section 215 ordered reports to be provided to Congress regarding the U.S. efforts to encourage
increased diplomatic relations between Israel and other countries. 74
The President's most prominent response to these sections was made public in his signing statement. 75  He declared
that he would interpret Section 214 to be advisory and that it interfered with his constitutional authority to conduct
foreign relations on behalf of the United States. 76  President Bush, like President Clinton, also continued to exercise the
national security waiver found in the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 77  throughout his term in office. 78  Consistent with
Clinton's opinion regarding Section 214, President Bush also stated that Section 215 would be subject to his authority
to withhold, as a security matter, foreign affairs information from Congress at his discretion. 79
Throughout President Obama's term, Congress has introduced three *239  bills aimed at forcing the President to
recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. These bills include the Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Act of 2009, 80
the Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Act of 2011, 81  and the Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Act of 2013. 82
All three of these bills have repeated the congressional position stated in the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 with one
key distinction. 83  All three of the Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Acts include a clause to amend the 1995 act
by revoking the presidential waiver. 84  There has been little to no reaction from the Obama administration to these
proposals.
Despite his lack of response to the Jerusalem Embassy and Recognition Acts, President Obama has continued, like
President Clinton and President Bush, to exercise the presidential waiver found in the Jerusalem Embassy Act. 85  As
with the George W. Bush administration, the Department of Justice and the State Department under President Obama
have also responded to a lawsuit brought by the parents of Menachem Zivotofsky based on the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003. 86  Zivotofsky seeks to have his place of birth listed as “Jerusalem, Israel” or “Israel”
on his passport, rather than simply “Jerusalem.” 87  The litigation has hinted at a growing flexibility in U.S. law and
policy toward a final solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 88
B. The Zivotofsky Litigation
Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 states that “for purposes of the registration
of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem,
the Secretary shall, upon request of the citizen or the citizen's legal guardian, record the place of birth as Israel.” 89
On October 17, 2002, Menachem Benyamin Zivotofsky was born in Shaare Zedek Medical Center, a hospital located
within *240  Jerusalem's 1948 borders to American parents, making him a U.S. citizen. 90  Zivotofsky's parents filed
an application for a U.S. passport and a consular report of birth abroad (CRBA) requesting that his place of birth be
listed as “Jerusalem, Israel.” 91  Based on the policy set forth in its Foreign Affairs Manual, which codified long-standing
Executive Branch policy, 92  the State Department denied Zivotofsky's request and issued a passport and a CRBA listing
“Jerusalem” as the place of birth. 93
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1. Initial Proceedings: Standing
Zivotofsky filed his claim in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in September 2003. 94  The Zivotofskys
sought a declaratory judgment against the Secretary and an injunction ordering the Secretary to issue a CRBA and a
passport listing “Jerusalem, Israel” as the place of birth and ordering embassies to comply with Section 214(d). 95  The
Secretary of State, then Colin Powell, asserted that the case was non-justiciable both because the Zivotofskys had suffered
no actual injury (the designation did not impede his ability to travel) and because the dispute over Jerusalem was a
political question and therefore beyond the constitutional competence of federal courts to adjudicate. 96  The U.S. *241
Government also relied on President Bush's signing statement in support of the argument that Section 214(d) was an
unconstitutional encroachment on Executive authority. 97  U.S. District Court Judge Gladys Kessler ultimately agreed
that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the case was a non-judiciable political question constitutionally allocated to
Congress and the President for resolution. 98  As a non-justiciable dispute, Judge Kessler did not reach the underlying
issue of Congress's attempt to regulate Jerusalem's status. 99
The Secretary's motion was fundamentally tied to the Bush Administration's vision for a two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict:
President Bush, in a June 24, 2002 speech, outlined the United States vision for a settlement of the conflict
consistent with U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. The President called for a new Palestinian leadership and
voiced support, under certain conditions, for the “creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and certain
aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle
East.” . . . the status of Jerusalem will be addressed in Phase III, during Permanent Status Negotiations. 100
Following the District Court's decision, Zivotofsky appealed. 101  Between the decision of the District Court and his
appeal, Zivotofsky amended his claim to request that his passport read “Israel” rather than “Jerusalem, Israel,” 102
arguing that listing only “Israel” would make his passport indistinguishable from that of any person born in an
undisputed *242  part of Israel. 103  In his brief, the Secretary did not distinguish between “Israel” and “Jerusalem,
Israel,” contending that listing “Israel” would still present a political question because it implicated recognition of Israeli
sovereignty over Jerusalem. 104  As before, he argued that Section 214(d) encroached upon Executive authority and
should either be read as advisory or unconstitutional. 105  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
determined that Congress may create an individual right by enacting a statute, creating an injury that otherwise would
not have existed, effectively rejecting Judge Kessler's standing determination. 106  Because of Zivotofsky's amendment to
his claim, the Court of Appeals concluded that Judge Kessler had not resolved the political question issue. 107  As such,
the court remanded the case for discovery on the amended claim. 108
The U.S. Government again tied its position on Jerusalem to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict noting that
“Israel's claim to sovereignty over Jerusalem is highly contested. The Palestinian Authority claims ‘East Jerusalem as
the capital of the future state of Palestine.”’ 109
2. Secondary Proceedings: Political Question
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Following discovery, the Secretary (then Condoleezza Rice) expanded the political question argument. 110  Consistent
with previous pleadings, the Secretary first argued that decisions of foreign policy are *243  constitutionally committed
to Congress and the Executive, 111  and this issue could not be separated from U.S. foreign policy regarding Israel. 112
She also argued that because the court would be required to make an initial policy determination about U.S. foreign
policy in order to resolve this case, 113  it would require an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion and there were no manageable judicial standards to resolve the claim. 114  Next, the Secretary argued that
deciding the case would express a lack of respect for the executive branch 115  by calling into question the President's
policy of official neutrality toward Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem. 116  She also contended that there was a need
to adhere to a political decision already made 117  because a change in U.S. policy regarding Jerusalem would harm
foreign relations with Arab nations. 118  For the same reasons, deciding the case could result in embarrassment from
differing pronouncements by multiple branches on the same issue. 119  Based on these factors, the District Court granted
the Secretary's motion to dismiss on political question grounds. 120
In the alternative, the Secretary contended that the case would fail on the merits 121  based on three doctrines: the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, 122  the rule against implied repeals, 123  and the tradition of judicial deference to
the executive branch on foreign affairs matters. 124  Because the court granted the motion for summary judgment based
on the political question doctrine, it did not consider these arguments. 125
In its appellate brief before the D.C. Circuit, the government repeated the connection between Jerusalem and the two-
state solution: “The United States has remained committed to promoting a final and permanent resolution of these core
issues, including the status of Jerusalem, with the support of the international community, in order to achieve the goal of
two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living *244  side-by-side in peace and security.” 126  Indeed, the brief quoted
at length from President George W. Bush's July 16, 2007 speech:
negotiations must resolve difficult questions and uphold clear principles. They must ensure that Israel
is secure. They must guarantee that a Palestinian state is viable and contiguous. And they must lead to
a territorial settlement, with mutually agreed borders reflecting previous lines and current realities, and
mutually agreed adjustments. America is prepared to lead discussions to address these issues, but they must
be resolved by Palestinians and Israelis, themselves. Resolving these issues would help show Palestinians a
clear way forward. And ultimately, it could lead to a final peace in the Middle East - a permanent end to
the conflict, and an agreement on all the issues, including refugees and Jerusalem. 127
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal based on the political question doctrine and did not consider
the merits of the case. 128  In a concurring opinion, Justice Edwards stated that he would reach the merits and find §
214(d) to be unconstitutional. 129  He contended that this case was justiciable because it is within the power of the court
to interpret and determine the legality of a statute. 130  He framed the issue differently than the majority: did “enacting §
214(d) . . . impermissibly intrud[e] on the President's exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns”? 131  In answer to
this question, Justice Edwards first stated that the Constitution gives the President exclusive power to recognize foreign
sovereigns, 132  and the President's passport policy in this case is an extension of that power. 133  Because § 214(d) uses
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the term “shall,” but it is not used in § 214(a), Congress intended for the § 214(d) to be mandatory. 134  As such, Justice
Edwards maintained that § 214(d) must be found unconstitutional. 135
*245  3. The U.S. Supreme Court Reverses
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 2, 2011. 136  Eight justices rejected lower courts' finding that the
political question doctrine barred adjudication and remanded to the D.C. Circuit to decide whether section 214(d)
was a constitutional exercise of Congress's authority to regulate the contents of passports, or whether it impermissibly
encroached on the President's Article II authority to recognize foreign governments. 137
The U.S. Supreme Court determined that, while there may be a constitutional commitment to the President to recognize
foreign sovereigns, the Court has the authority to determine the constitutionality of a statute. 138  In addition, the Court
concluded that because the dispute ultimately raised an issue of statutory interpretation, federal courts enjoyed a number
of manageable standards for resolving the question. 139
Justice Sotomayor concurred, but implied that the Court should have applied more rigorous inquiry to the issue and
further questioned the Court's conclusion that statutes generally fall outside the political question doctrine's reach. 140
Justice Alito concurred as well, emphasizing that both Congress and the President enjoy authority over the contents of
passports. 141
Justice Breyer dissented, listing four reasons the dispute fell outside federal courts' competence to resolve. 142  First, the
case involved foreign affairs, an area over which the judiciary was not intended to participate. 143  Second, evaluating
the constitutionality of § 214(d) could require the Court to evaluate foreign policy decisions. 144  Third, Zivotofsky's
interest in receiving a judgment was not great enough to constitute interference with the political branches. 145  Finally,
the Executive and Legislative branches have methods to work out foreign policy issues without interference from the
judiciary. 146
More importantly for purposes of interpreting the U.S. position on Jerusalem, the U.S. Government's brief before the
U.S. Supreme Court *246  marked a departure from the strict two-state view set forth in the lower court proceedings.
Not only did the Government explicitly reject Palestinian authority over the West Bank and Gaza, it reminded the court
of the historical U.S. position that Jerusalem should be under international control. “The Executive similarly does not
recognize Palestinian claims to current sovereignty in Jerusalem, the West Bank, or the Gaza Strip, pending the outcome
of these negotiations.” 147  It repeated its uncertainty over the West Bank and Gaza again later in the brief. 148  “Jerusalem
should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under international
control.” 149
4. The D.C. Circuit Declares Section 214(d) Unconstitutional
On remand, the parties' arguments focused on the President's Article II authority to receive ambassadors, 150  and, by
extension, the authority to recognize foreign sovereigns. 151  By attempting to alter U.S. foreign policy with regard to
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Jerusalem's status, the Secretary argued, Congress had unconstitutionally interfered with the President's authority. 152
The D.C. Circuit agreed, largely adopting Judge Edward's concurrence in the political question litigation.
The D.C. Circuit relied on a wealth of historical data suggesting that the Legislative Branch had previously deferred to
the President's judgment when recognizing foreign governments. 153  Beginning with President Washington, it found that
Congress did not make recognition decisions even in 1793. 154  The court also noted that Congress historically would not
recognize the existence of a state without executive recognition. 155  The D.C. Circuit further ruled that Congress does
not enjoy exclusive control over passport matters, 156  and that passport contents must be informed by the Executive's
foreign policy authority. 157  Because § 214(d) directly conflicts with the Executive's *247  foreign policy, 158  the court
invalidated the statute on constitutional grounds. 159
With what could only be described as consistent litigation losses for the Government and the increasing presence of
members of Congress in amici supporting the Zivotofskys as well as the strategic attempt to persuade certain members
of the Court, it is understandable that the government's brief before the U.S. Supreme Court made far more extensive
reference to the Executive's recognition power. But even given that, there was no obvious reason to include the West Bank
and Gaza as territories similarly lacking a recognized sovereign, and by extension, similarly undefined political futures.
In the opening pages of its brief, the Government reasserted that “the Executive does not officially recognize
Palestinian claims to current sovereignty in Jerusalem, the West Bank, or the Gaza Strip, pending the outcome of these
negotiations” 160  and that “[s]ince the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the status and borders of Jerusalem have
been a matter of controversy and disagreement between Israel, the Palestinian people, and Israel's Arab neighbors.” 161
“People born in Jerusalem, the West Bank or Gaza today are not allowed to record Palestine on their passports any
more than they are allowed to record Israel.” 162
C. Presidential Speeches Since Clinton
It is possible that the transition in the government's pleadings in Zivotofsky-from a specifically two-state view to an
amorphous and undefined political entity which may or may not include Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza-are purely
coincidental, shaped by the need to respond to the changing constellation of law firms, lawyers, and amici in the case, or
a function of the increasing role of the State Department as the case moved to the U.S. Supreme Court and implicated
the Executive's powers in a more direct and threatening way. Yet these changes in the government's pleadings were
accompanied by noticeable shifts in the direction of presidential speeches as well. In 2009, President Obama's first speech
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict repeated Clinton's and Bush's position that the solution involved two secure states. In
2011, he ruffled feathers by stating explicitly that the borders of the two states should be drawn along the 1967 lines, a
statement which implicated the division of Jerusalem. By 2013, Obama *248  had loosened this language, referring to
Israel's decision that “only [Israel] can determine what kind of democracy [it] will have” and quoting Ariel Sharon that
“it is impossible to have a Jewish, democratic state at the same time to control all of Eretz Israel. If we insist on fulfilling
the dream in its entirety, we are liable to lose it all.”
1. William J. Clinton
President Clinton oversaw the crest of the feasibility of the two-state solution between 1993, when Israel and the PLO
signed the Oslo Accords on the White House lawn, and 2000, when the specific terms of a final agreement appeared in
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documents drafted at Taba, Egypt. 163  For most of his presidency, then, Clinton's speeches focused earlier on praising
the Oslo Accords, their drafters, and their intended implementers, and later on encouraging both sides to return to
Oslo's principles. The Oslo process began breaking down in 1998, and Clinton's speeches reflected increased urgency
at salvaging the Oslo framework which emphasized Palestinian self-rule in discrete areas until final status negotiations
could conclude. Indeed, in a pair of speeches delivered to the Israeli and Palestinian governments in December 1998,
Clinton appeared to acknowledge the impending collapse of Oslo. To the Palestinian National Council he remarked:
I want the people of Israel to know that for many Palestinians, 5 years after Oslo, the benefits of this process
remain remote, that for too many Palestinians lives are hard, jobs are scarce, prospects are uncertain, and
personal grief is great. I know that tremendous pain remains as a result of losses suffered from violence, the
separation of families, the restrictions on the movement of people and goods. I understand your concerns
about settlement activity, land confiscation, and home demolitions. 164
To the Israelis:
Of course, there have been setbacks, more misunderstandings, more disagreements, more provocations,
more acts of violence. You feel Palestinians should prove in word and deed that their intentions have
actually changed, as you redeploy from land on *249  which tears and blood have been shed, and you are
right to feel that. 165
President Clinton's final official speech on the conflict took place at the Israeli Policy Forum on January 7, 2001. 166
He delivered the speech nearly six months into the second Palestinian intifada, a result of the failed final status talks
concluded at Taba. 167  The speech was emphatic as to two states as the solution to the conflict. 168  Clinton put forth
five parameters intended to bring the two parties closer to a permanent settlement. 169  First, there must be a sovereign
Palestinian state including Gaza and most of the West Bank. 170  Second, Palestinian refugees must be provided with a
permanent place to live, either in a new Palestinian homeland or elsewhere in the world, and they should be compensated
by the international community. 171  Third, Israel must have guarantees of security which should be enforced by an
“international presence” in the Jordan Valley. 172  Fourth, Jerusalem, because of its importance to both parties, 173
should be “open and undivided” and act as the capital for both states. 174  Clinton indicated that the Arab portions of
Jerusalem should belong to the Palestinians and the Jewish portions should belong to Israel. 175  Sites which are holy to
both sides should be accessible to everyone. 176  Fifth, an agreement must be accompanied by a decision on both sides
to end the conflict and uphold all compromises. 177
He counseled the Palestinians to negotiate rather than resist through violence 178  and he reminded the Israelis that the
homeland they returned to was not vacant, so they would need to compromise for peace. 179  Clinton pledged to spend
his remaining days in office assisting the parties. 180
*250  2. George W. Bush
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President Bush's first speech related to the conflict was intertwined with the U.S. reaction to the September 11, 2001
attacks. 181  Speaking at the United Nations on November 10, 2001, he denounced terrorism in general and nations who
supported any kind of assistance to terrorist groups. 182  He nevertheless adopted Clinton's perspective on resolution of
the Arab-Israeli conflict. 183  President Bush supported “two states-Israel and Palestine” and vowed to bring the parties
back to the negotiating table. 184
President Bush's first speech dedicated specifically to Israel/Palestine took place in the Rose Garden on June 24, 2002.
In that speech, he primarily called for a change in Palestinian leadership. 185  Bush proposed that the United States
and other nations and international institutions-what became known as the Quartet of the United States, the European
Union, the United Nations, and Russia-assist the Palestinians in creating a new constitution, organize elections, and
establish a judicial system as well as contribute economically to the development of the West Bank and Gaza and aid
Palestinian refugees. 186
Bush repeated messages to the Palestinians and the Israelis that gave generally characterized Executive statements about
the conflict. He demanded that Palestinians end terrorist activities and that Israelis end settlement building and land
confiscation. 187  Echoing Clinton, he stated that a settlement should be based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, 188
suggesting that the borders between Israel and Jordan as of May 1967 serve as the base line for borders between Israel
and Palestine. 189  He also reminded Israelis that Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and peace with Lebanon and Syria
would necessarily accompany final status negotiations. 190
*251  On November 27, 2007 President Bush spoke at the Annapolis Conference, opening renewed negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 191  The speech repeated the U.S. position that two states must form the basis of a
final solution. 192  As in his 2002 speech, 193  President Bush called on the Palestinians to create a just nation and denounce
terrorism. 194  Likewise, he called on the Israelis to end settlement activities and emphasized the potential economic gains
accompanying a prosperous Palestine. 195  Similarly, President Bush called on the international community, including
other Arab states, to support Israel and Palestine in both their internal affairs, as well as in creating positive connections
with other nations. 196  He also pledged support from the United States 197  and his personal support, as Clinton did, 198
for his remaining time in office. 199
President Bush addressed the Knesset on May 17, 2008 200  in recognition of the 60th anniversary of Israel's founding, 201
as well as the anniversary of President Truman's recognition of Israel. 202  He predicted both Israel and a Palestinian
state living in peaceful, democratic state as well as tolerance and freedom throughout the Middle East. 203  He compared
his vision with the reality of Europe and Japan's peace and prosperity in the six decades following World War II, despite
its destruction and horror. 204
Six months later, President Bush spoke at the Saban Forum in Washington, D.C. 205  Although the majority of this
speech addressed the Middle East in general, the President did make some brief comments *252  about the Arab-Israeli
conflict. 206  He made clear that the United States would defend its interests and allies from hostile actions in the Middle
East. 207  He once again confirmed his commitment to the two-state solution, 208  denounced terrorism, 209  and praised
the progress made by both parties at negotiations begun at the Annapolis Conference. 210
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3. Barack Obama
During his June 4, 2009 speech at Cairo University in Egypt, 211  President Obama identified the Arab-Israeli conflict
as one of the major sources of tension in the Middle East. 212  Like President Bush before him, 213  he declared the
bond between the United States and Israel to be unbreakable. 214  He also declared that threats toward Israel were
wrong, 215  and Palestinians must not use violent tactics against Israel. 216  He described the situation of the Palestinian
people as “intolerable” 217  and recognized their right to exist as equal to Israel's. 218  President Obama called on Israel
to halt settlement activities and allow Palestinians to develop their own society. 219  He called on the Arab nations to
recognize Israel's legitimacy and aid Palestinians. 220  Finally, like both President Clinton 221  and Bush, 222  President
Obama supported the two-state solution 223  to the Arab-Israeli conflict and pledged his personal assistance to aid in
the outcome. 224
On May 19, 2011, President Obama spoke in Washington, D.C. about a range of issues facing the United States with
respect to its interests in the Middle East and North Africa. 225  Despite setbacks in *253  talks between the parties,
including the continuation of settlement activities by the Israelis, 226  President Obama stated that he believed peace
was still possible. 227  He insisted that Palestine must not deny Israel's right to exist, and, as in his speech in Cairo, 228
called for an end to Palestinian violence. 229  President Obama again 230  supported separate Israeli and Palestinian states
as the solution for peace. 231  He indicated that the borders should be based on the lines held in 1967, 232  eliciting a
sharply negative response from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. 233  This peace should be accompanied by
the gradual removal of the Israeli military from occupied areas. 234  He also recognized that both parties would need to
come to agreement about the status of Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees. 235
In a pair of speeches at the United Nations delivered in 2010 and 2011, Obama both repeated his support for the two-state
solution and directed that the shape of that solution must be fashioned by the parties themselves. 236  While the latter
statement was consistent with his May 2011 speech and a renewed U.S. effort to bring the parties back to the negotiating
table, it was more specifically directed at the Palestinian bid for statehood at the United Nations. While Obama did not
explicitly mention that he would instruct a veto at the Security Council, he noted that
Peace will not come through statements and resolutions at the United Nations - if it were that easy, it would
have been accomplished by now. Ultimately, it is the Israelis and the Palestinians who must live side by side.
Ultimately, it is the Israelis and the Palestinians - not us--who must reach *254  agreement on the issues
that divide them: on borders and on security, on refugees and Jerusalem. 237
On March 21, 2013, President Obama spoke at the Jerusalem International Convention Center. 238  He opened by
praising the prosperity of the Israeli people 239  despite their present and historical suffering, 240  and mentioned the
immediate U.S. recognition of Israel by President Truman, 241  just as President Bush did in 2008. 242  Unlike Presidents
Clinton and Bush, whose comments were primarily focused towards the actions of national leaders, President Obama
chose to direct his comments toward young Israelis, 243  encouraging them to push their leaders to make peace. 244
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While Obama again mentioned “two states for two peoples” as his belief about where negotiations must lead, he made
no mention of the 1967 armistice lines between Israel and Jordan and he placed emphasis on the alternative possibility
that Israel may become a state with a much larger Arab population: “only you can determine what kind of democracy
you will have,” 245  implying that Israel cannot continue settlement activities and control of the occupied territories and
remain a Jewish majority democracy. 246  President Obama also quoted former Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon: “it
is impossible to have a Jewish democratic state, and at the same time to control all of Eretz Israel. If we insist on fulfilling
the dream in its entirety, we are liable to lose it all.” 247  Indeed, Obama's call for two-states notwithstanding, the tone
of his remarks was decidedly ecumenical:
*255  That's where peace begins, not just in the plans of leaders, but in the hearts of people; not just in
some carefully designed process, but in the daily connections, that sense of empathy that takes place among
those who live together in this land and in this sacred city of Jerusalem. 248
III. The Shift in the Palestinian Movement for Self-Determination from Sovereignty to Civil Rights
It is not possible at this time to tie with firm evidence the subtle shifts in U.S. policy arguably revealed in the Zivotofsky
litigation and presidential speeches with changes on the ground, but those changes are certainly under way. Palestinians
in Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem are increasingly adopting Hebrew into their educational curricula; Arab
Jerusalem residents are increasingly electing to attend Israeli universities; East Jerusalem itself is undergoing a process
of “Israelization” which diminishes its feasibility as a political capital for a future Palestinian state; the Palestinian
leadership, after a failed effort at U.N. recognition in 2011, increasingly discuss the desirability of “exiting” the Oslo
peace process; and, the Israeli settlement of Ma'ale Adumim, which Israel has persistently stated it will never relinquish,
effectively obstructs the possibility for a viable Palestinian state. A Palestinian civil rights movement that emphasizes
equality between Arabs and Jews living under Israeli control is slowly but surely displacing the movement historically
led in the name of sovereignty and membership in the community of nations.
A. The Israelization of East Jerusalem
East Jerusalemites increasingly elect Israeli citizenship, vote in Jerusalem municipal elections, and elect places in
Israeli universities, trends which move against the city's socially divided past. 249  Approximately 801,000 people live
in Jerusalem. 250  Of these, about 35% are Palestinian and 62% are Jewish. 251  Although Palestinians are a minority in
Jerusalem, the growth rate of the Palestinian population has been higher than that of the Jewish population over the
last several years. 252
*256  1. Education
Immediately following the Six-Day War and Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem, Arab educators and parents refused
the imposition of Israeli curricula in their schools. 253  After a two-year strike, the Israeli government allowed Jordanian,
later Palestinian, curricula to be taught in Jerusalem's Arab schools. 254  Despite these long-standing features of education
in the Arab parts of Jerusalem, teachers, and students are increasingly turning to the Israeli education system 255  because
they believe it will lead to better opportunities in the long run. 256
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In 2013, eligibility for bagrut-Israeli matriculation-increased 5% over the previous five years among Arab students, a
trend explained by a number of phenomena relevant to the conflict generally. 257  Since the Israeli government began
building its security barrier in 2002, it has become increasingly difficult to travel to Arab universities outside Jerusalem;
it is faster and simpler to attend Israeli universities on the Jerusalem side of the barrier. 258  The extra courses required
for students studying Palestinian curricula to prepare for Israeli matriculation exams are expensive. 259  Demand from
parents and students has led Jerusalem city officials to implement Israeli curriculum as an option in some East Jerusalem
schools to eliminate the need for extra courses. 260  The Israeli curriculum is considered by some to be more valuable to
gain opportunities for jobs and higher education. 261
This trend is also reflected in the expansion of Hebrew language education not only in East Jerusalem, but in schools in
the West Bank and Gaza. Hebrew and Arabic are both Semitic languages. 262  *257  They share many word roots and
grammatical principles. 263  Many words sound the same and Arabic grammar is more difficult than Hebrew grammar,
so Hebrew is fairly easy to learn for Arabic speakers. 264  While Hebrew has not yet become officially sanctioned by
the Palestinian Ministry of Education (it is officially offered in Gaza), private schools in the West Bank are expanding
Hebrew language offerings. 265  At the Mohammed bin Rashid Bin Al-Maktoum School near Ramallah, 120 out of 600
students enrolled in its Hebrew courses. 266  There are also schools in East Jerusalem which are now offering Israeli
curriculum at the encouragement of the Israeli government. 267
For Palestinians inside or outside of Jerusalem, knowledge of Hebrew is pursued for both pragmatic and political reasons.
Degrees from Arab universities are not always recognized in Israel, forcing the degree holders to take lower-paying
jobs in Gaza and the West Bank rather than in Israel. 268  Students who take the Palestinian matriculation exam, the
tawjih, but wish to study at Israeli universities must undergo an additional year of education to demonstrate adequate
skills in Hebrew. 269  By learning Hebrew, students in East Jerusalem can choose to prepare for the bagrut instead and
bypass the extra year of study. 270  Because Israel is more technologically developed 271  and its education system places
more emphasis on math and science, 272  this is particularly beneficial for students who are interested in science and
medicine. 273  Those who elect to continue on the Palestinian course of study will still have *258  more job opportunities
over the Israeli border if they can communicate in Hebrew. 274
Politically, the expansion of Hebrew language proficiency enhances Palestinians' access to information about
developments in Israel and, for those committed to it, serves a peace promoting purpose. 275  While Arabic media outlets
translate Hebrew language news services, the information is filtered and shaped, limiting the ability for Palestinians to
listen to first-hand accounts of Israeli actions and attitudes. 276
2. Housing and Water
Housing and utilities are a major problem for the residents of East Jerusalem. 277  Without documentation of property
ownership, residents may not obtain a building permit; without a permit, residents may be denied utilities or have their
homes destroyed. 278  Housing density is higher in Arab households than in Jewish ones, almost double in 2009. 279
Housing costs in the eastern part of the city are high 280  and it is inconvenient to travel from East Jerusalem to the rest
of the city. 281  East Jerusalem neighborhoods outside the security fence are particularly disadvantaged. 282
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As a result, many Arab residents have begun to move into Jewish neighborhoods in other parts of Jerusalem. 283  There,
housing costs are lower and it is easier to travel to jobs, schools, and other places. 284  The mayor of Jerusalem, Nir
Barkat, has created a system allowing residents who cannot prove ownership of land to obtain a temporary permit
which becomes permanent after twenty years of undisputed ownership. 285  As a result, demolitions in East Jerusalem
*259  are lower than in previous years 286  and housing density among Arab households has decreased. 287  Hagihon,
Jerusalem's water provider, indicated that it would continue laying more pipes and installing more water meters in East
Jerusalem. 288  This will provide residents with a more reliable source of water 289  and generate revenue for the city. 290
3. Health
Until the 1990s, East Jerusalem's healthcare services lagged far behind the rest of the city in terms of both quality and
access. 291  In January 1995, the National Health Insurance Law went into effect; it required all residents and citizens
to become a member of a health-care organization. 292  Health-care organizations must provide the following services:
medical diagnosis and treatment at clinics and at home, preventative medicine and health education, hospitalization,
surgery and transplant, preventative dental care for children, first aid and transportation to a clinic or hospital, medical
services at the workplace, treatment for drug and alcohol abuse, medical equipment and appliances, obstetrics and
fertility treatments, treatment of injuries caused by violence, medications, treatment of chronic diseases, and paramedical
services. 293
Following the enactment of this law, there was a large increase in both the number and quality of medical clinics and
services available in East Jerusalem. Many clinics now have their own advanced medical equipment and transportation
services. 294  They also have a close connection with the neighborhoods they service, going out of their way to ensure
that residents seek out proper preventative care. 295
*260  As a result, health quality indices in East Jerusalem have risen significantly-from 74 in 2009 to 87 in 2012-making
them almost equal with the national average. 296  Improvements in health care quality are also evidenced by a sharp
decrease in mortality rate among Arab residents. 297  The mortality rate dropped from 4.5 deaths per 1,000 persons in the
1980s to 2.9 deaths per person in the 2000s. 298  By contrast the decrease in the mortality rate of the Jewish population
was much more moderate, falling from 5.9 deaths per 1,000 persons in the 1980s to 5.2 deaths per 1,000 persons in the
2000s. 299
4. Arab Migration into West Jerusalem and Israeli Naturalization
Jerusalem's Arabs are not only moving to Jewish neighborhoods, increasing numbers are also seeking Israeli
citizenship. 300  When East Jerusalem was annexed, the Palestinians living there were granted only residency, not
citizenship; however, they have the right to apply for Israeli citizenship. 301  Permanent residency status denies Jerusalem's
Arabs many rights, particularly the right to live wherever they would like in Israel. 302  If an Arab resident leaves
Jerusalem for more than seven years, the government may revoke her residency permit 303  and she may lose her home. 304
Israeli citizenship allows Arabs to move within Israel and Jerusalem 305  and to vote in national elections. 306  Israeli
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citizens may not travel to all parts of the West Bank, only those areas under Israeli or joint Israeli and Palestinian
control. 307
A 2011 poll of East Jerusalem residents reported that 35% of East Jerusalem residents would prefer to become Israeli
citizens, 30% would choose Palestine, and 35% either declined to answer or did not know. 308  In addition, 40% of
Palestinians in East Jerusalem *261  said they would move in order to become Israeli citizens, and even a larger number
of Palestinians living in refugee camps would choose Israeli citizenship. 309  These results confirm the results of a similar
poll conducted for the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations in 2010. 310
The impetus to Israeli citizenship among these groups is driven by pragmatic advantages in education, health care, and
basic services, notwithstanding formal and informal forms of discrimination against Arabs in Israeli society. 311  Arabs
who have moved into Jewish neighborhoods have experienced resistance to their presence. 312  Yet their security situation
in East Jerusalem is just as tenuous; the state funds private security guards to protect Jewish settlers in areas of East
Jerusalem; Arabs in the same neighborhoods are not so protected. 313
Beginning in 2002, Israel began constructing a set of concrete walls, ditches and fences (the “separation barrier”)
separating its territory and settlements from Arab population centers. 314  The separation barrier winds through Arab
East Jerusalem and includes some major Arab neighborhoods but excludes others. 315  Palestinians living outside the wall
are far more deprived relative to “Israel-side” Jerusalemites. 316  There are approximately 60,000 Palestinian residents of
East Jerusalem living outside the separation wall. 317  They typically do not have access to basic services from the city, and
the Palestinian Authority may not enter the area to provide them with security or services under the Oslo Accords. 318
The Israeli government initially began building the fence to provide security from attacks originating from the West
Bank. 319  *262  However, Israeli security forces have recently become concerned that completion of the wall will actually
increase security problems. 320  They believe that completely ending illegal entry of Palestinians into Jerusalem may
destabilize the Palestinian economy and lead to escalating unrest. 321  As a result, security forces are considering granting
more work permits as the wall is completed. 322  There is no consensus on what the changes in East Jerusalem will mean
for the city as a whole although the increasing integration between East and West Jerusalem threatens the feasibility of
neatly separating Arab and Jewish areas. 323
B. “Exiting” Oslo
The Oslo Accords function in practice if not in form as an international treaty, even though they are officially a
“Declaration of Principles” and they regulate the relationship between parties clearly authorized to enter into a treaty
(Israel, Russia, and the United States) and a party whose status under international law is less clear. 324  Unlike many
treaties, the Oslo Accords themselves provide no mechanism for termination, although assuming the parties formed a
treaty to which the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is applicable, either side may claim that a material breach
of treaty provisions “entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its
operation in whole or in part.” 325  Indeed, this is more or less what both have asserted about the other-Israel arguing
that the Palestinians have breached their promises with respect to Israeli security and the Palestinians arguing that Israel
has not only failed to stop expropriating land, but has accelerated settlement and built a barrier deep into Palestinian
territory.
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Legal and scholarly analysis of the Oslo Accords have produced a wide range of conclusions as to what they originally
intended. 326  Those *263  conclusions are invariably shaped by the viewpoints of their analysts. Israeli opponents viewed
Oslo as a Trojan horse giving legitimacy to a sworn enemy of Israel and a base from which the PLO could attack as it
had from Jordan and Lebanon. 327  Palestinian opponents saw Oslo as a massive surrender of rights established under
a long line of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and an agreement which privileged Israeli security over the human
cost of military occupation. 328  Certainly, the Accords supported the view taken by the United States (although not
until 2000) that the eventual resolution was two sovereign states, but the document itself never promised that, referring
obliquely to U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 which themselves were vaguely worded so as to accommodate the conflicting
interests they were drafted to reflect. 329
Whatever the beginning and end of Oslo-and there is widespread agreement that the Oslo project not only failed but may
have never even began-it can be safely stated that it envisioned segregated Israeli and Palestinian populations living under
political authorities to which each was accountable. 330  Between 2009 and 2011, the Palestinian Authority attempted to
have the two-state vision implied by Oslo made explicit through admission of Palestine as a state to the United Nations
with the pre-June 6, 1967 armistice lines between Jordan and Israel as the borders of the new state, a position taken by the
PLO in 1988. Palestine's effort failed, largely because of a promised veto by the United States, who, as the aforementioned
speech by Obama stated, that two states need to be achieved by bilateral negotiations.
Since that failure, the Palestinian leadership has put in place alternatives to statehood under international law. First, it
has sketched out the possibility of withdrawing from the Oslo Accords, undertaking a widespread non-violent protest
movement akin to those undertaken between 1936 and 1939, and dissolving the Palestinian Administration and altering
the mandate of the PLO. 331  Saeb Erakat, the Palestinians' chief negotiator, raised the one state solution as an alternative
*264  possibility with former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, President Obama's envoy to the parties, as early as 2009. 332
Indeed, there is some evidence that among younger Palestinians, a civil rights movement approach to the conflict-with a
single political entity as its aim-is far more likely to achieve Oslo's stated purpose of “a just, lasting and comprehensive
peace settlement and historic reconciliation . . . .” 333  Given the unpredictable nature of Palestinian self-determination
movements and aims-the 1987 intifada was spontaneous and amorphous-it is not clear when top-level bureaucratic
frustration and bottom-up movements for equal rights under Israeli rule might coalesce.
C. The Problem of Ma'ale Adumim
1. Dividing the West Bank and East Jerusalem
Ma'ale Adumim is an Israeli settlement established around 1973 and given official recognition by the Israeli government
in 1977. 334
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
335
Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only
JERUSALEM IN THE COURTS AND ON THE GROUND, 26 Fla. J. Int'l L. 223
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 20
It is located roughly three miles east of Jerusalem, 336  in territory *265  captured by Israel in 1967. 337  It started as a small
settlement of about 2,000 residents 338  and has expanded to approximately 39,000 today. 339  Although it is only one of
many settlements in the area immediately surrounding Jerusalem, it is situated so as to both cut off Palestinian access to
East Jerusalem and to disrupt territorial contiguity between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank. 340  The
boundaries of Ma'ale Adumim are oddly shaped, and take up more than twice the space of the actual settlement. 341
The expansive boundaries, especially when combined with the E-1 area, effectively separate the large Palestinian cities
of Bethlehem and Ramallah, forcing Palestinians to use a circuitous route around the settlement, 342  or to pass through
Israeli checkpoints. 343
In Ma'ale Adumim, Israeli Jews can find low cost housing-much lower than housing in Jerusalem 344 -and the commute to
Jerusalem is short, making it convenient for those who work there. 345  As such, Ma'ale Adumim has effectively become
a mainstream suburb of Jerusalem with the independent infrastructure necessary to maintain a community. 346  Many of
the schools, retailers, synagogues, and community centers received government subsidies to encourage expansion within
the settlement. 347
Plans to build more homes were announced in 2000, just before the start of renewed negotiations between the Israelis
and the Palestinians. 348  The Palestinians issued a formal complaint to the Israelis, stating that the announcement
indicated that Israel would be *266  unwilling to make the necessary concessions for peace. 349  Following the failure
of the 2000 negotiations, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon prioritized continued expansion despite active conflict with the
Palestinians. 350  By this time, the population of Ma'ale Adumim had expanded to 30,000 residents, although the actual
settlement encompassed less than half of the municipal territory claimed for it by the Israeli government. 351  In addition
to having a large amount of land claimed for the settlement, the borders were drawn in order to separate large areas of
the West Bank from each other. 352
In 2005, following the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, Israel announced intentions to begin construction on
thousands of new homes in Ma'ale Adumim. 353  Prime Minister Sharon stated that he intended to retain the Ma'ale
Adumim area in exchange for the loss of the Gaza Strip. 354  In 2007, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert pledged to halt
the building of any new settlements and stop the expropriation of additional land in the West Bank 355  but this
announcement was understood to allow Israel to continue building in Jerusalem and large settlements like Ma'ale
Adumim. 356  Similarly, in 2009, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu placed a moratorium building new homes in
the West Bank, including Ma'ale Adumim, to encourage peace talks with the Palestinians. 357  As before, there were
exceptions to the Israeli decision; they stated that building would continue in East Jerusalem and schools, synagogues,
public buildings, and other necessary structures would still be built in the West Bank. 358  In 2011, the Israeli government
made the decision to speed up the building of 2,000 more homes in West Bank areas, including Ma'ale Adumim, it would
like to keep once a settlement is reached. 359
Since at least 1982, U.S. administrations have discouraged Israeli expansion of Ma'ale Adumim (as well as all other
settlement activity *267  beyond the 1967 “green line”). In 1982, President Reagan stated that the expansion was an
obstacle to peace, and the area of Ma'ale Adumim should ultimately be governed by the Palestinians in association with
Jordan. 360  The Israeli government rejected Reagan's proposal. 361  The United States objected to building in Ma'ale
Adumim throughout the 1990s and 2000s because West Bank expansion violated U.S. peace blueprints which called
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for a freeze on settlement activity. 362  Throughout expansion plans, the Israeli government has clashed with both the
Bush 363  and the Obama administration. 364  The Bush administration sometimes objected to settlement and expansion
activities, 365  but stated that demographic makeup of the area should be taken into account during negotiations. 366  The
Obama administration has been more critical of settlement activity. 367
2. The E-1 Corridor
Like Ma'ale Adumim, the E-1 (East 1) corridor is located in territory captured by Israel in the Six-Day War with Jordan
in 1967, 368  and has been claimed as state land by the Israeli government. 369
It is approximately 12 square kilometers and sits north and west of Ma'ale Adumim, within its municipal area. 370
Though unfulfilled, there have been plans to build two residential areas, an industrial area, a hotel *268  area, and
a water reservoir in the E-1 area. 371  These plans were revived by the Israeli defense minister in 1997. 372  Beginning
in 2002, Israel began constructing a set of concrete walls, ditches and fences (the “separation barrier”) separating its
territory and settlements from Arab population centers. 373  The separation barrier wraps around the E-1 area and Ma'ale
Adumim. 374
TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
375
Work began on the E-1 corridor building plans in 2004, 376  which, like Ma'ale Adumim proper, Prime Minister Sharon
viewed as quid pro *269  quo for the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. 377  However, work was frozen temporarily
in 2005 when the Bush administration requested its cessation on behalf of the Palestinians. 378  In 2012, following a
successful bid by the Palestinians to be a non-member observer state in the United Nations, Israel announced that it
would implement plans to build 3,000 additional homes in the E-1 area. 379  This announcement was strongly objected to
by both the United States 380  and the European Union 381  as harmful to both the peace process and Israel's interests. 382
The new building was explicitly tied to securing Ma'ale Adumim and the E-1 corridor in any future settlement with
Palestine. 383
Including E-1 and Ma'ale Adumim within Israel's official borders would effectively complete a ring of Israeli settlements
in the West Bank surrounding East Jerusalem. 384  By settling immigrant Israelis there, 385  Israel will limit Palestinian
access to East Jerusalem. 386  This territory would also jut deep into the West Bank, jeopardizing continuity for a
Palestinian state. 387  The Israeli government claims that a road may be built that will provide Palestinians with unfettered
access between Ramallah, East Jerusalem, and Bethlehem although it is difficult to create such a road that would not
also conflict with Israeli security priorities. 388
Since 1982, the Israeli government has been adamant that they will not surrender Ma'ale Adumim or the E-1 area
to Palestinian control. 389  Indeed, Israeli prime ministers from every part of the Israeli political spectrum-Benjamin
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Netanyahu, Ehud Olmert, Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ariel Sharon have committed to retaining both as
part of any final agreement between Israel and Palestine although it is entirely possible that this is posturing. 390
The Clinton Parameters for peace called for Ma'ale Adumim to be annexed as compensation for agreeing *270  to
partition Jerusalem. 391  Israeli annexation of Ma'ale Adumim and E-1 would result in essentially four divided Palestinian
population centers: East Jerusalem, the Northern West Bank, the Southern West Bank, and Gaza. 392  Palestinian leaders
have emphasized the one-state solution as an alternative to disaggregated Palestinian territories. 393
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry is now in an energized effort to reach a final resolution based on the two-state solution,
an effort that, once again, involves a freeze on settlement expansion in the West Bank. 394  Israel has already declared
any such freeze will not include some settlements, including Ma'ale Adumim. 395  Echoing past cycles of negotiation and
failure (and potential redirection of the Palestinian self-determination movement), the Abbas government has responded
by refusing to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. 396
Conclusion
This Article has argued that by examining certain “interpretation catalysts”-presidential speeches from Clinton to Obama
and the U.S. Government's pleadings in its lawsuit with the Zivotofskys (and, by extension, Congress), it is possible to
see a growing flexibility toward adopting a foreign policy position that accommodates a Palestinian self-determination
movement that sounds more like civil rights in Israel rather than sovereignty under international law. The Article does not
argue that there has been a fundamental abandonment of the two-state solution in U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, President
Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have explicitly adopted it as their current platform in the predictable second-
term push for Arab-Israeli peace. However, given the realities on the ground, firstly and most importantly with respect
to Jerusalem, it is possible to see a U.S. acceptance that the time for the two-state solution may have already passed.
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